What is the difference between chinese communism and soviet communism?

Early Ideological Differences:

• The early Communist Party in China adhered closely to Russian political philosophy. However, Mao Zedong disagreed with the concept of a workers’ revolution in China. Reasoning that the majority of the Chinese population were peasants, Mao refocused the goal of Chinese communism toward the concept of a peasant revolution.
• Despite this, the two nations still shared fairly similar values until the 1950s, when a major ideological rift developed. During this time, the Soviet Union advocated coexistence with capitalism. China, meanwhile, remained determined to pursue a policy of aggression, labeling the United States in particular as an imperialist enemy and declaring an intent to assist with revolutionary struggles of people oppressed by imperialism.

Cultural:

• The other great difference is cultural. The Soviets lauded the cultural greats of the Russian past, while Mao’s tendency was to displace the historical culture. He even outlawed traditional medicine for a while. The so called “Cultural Revolution” was an anti-cultural revolution that did irreparable harm to countless treasures of lives, goods, and opportunities.

Political:

• Mao’s programme envisages co-operation and coalition with progressive bourgeois parties. Thus communist regime in China doesn’t profess to be dictatorship of proletariat. Chinese Communists didn’t seek to liquidate the bourgeois and private Capitalist, though they placed increasing restrictions on private business, but tolerated private capital.
• So Chinese Communism is modification of orthodox Marxism.

Other Differences:

• In the Soviet system, land was organized by collectivization. Stalin replaced the old system on private peasant farming with “collective farms” and “state farms”, where peasants would work for the greater good of the proletariat under strict party supervision. In China on the other had, they had a social obligation where there was a goal set by the government, and any surplus product that the farmers made, they were allowed to use as they wanted. This system gives farmers incentive to produce more than the set goal for their own personal gain.
• In Russia there was forced urbanization when Stalin made people move to the cities. In China on the other hand, Mao’s support was rural based, and people were kept out of the cities.
• The CPSU(Communist Party of Soviet Union) wanted to export world revolution and turn the world communist.  The CCP (Communist Party of China) doesn’t care what other countries do.  This means that the CCP doesn’t spend nearly as much money on the military as the CPSU did, and doesn’t maintain large and expensive armies in other countries.
• The CPSU was essential to the identity of the Soviet Union.  Without the CPSU, the Soviet Union could not exist, because without the CPSU, people became Russians and Ukaranians and Tajiks, and not Soviets.  China has a national identity that is independent of the Party, so it’s possible to imagine a non-communist or even anti-communist China.  Conversely, because China can exist without the CCP, it’s possible for the CCP to redefine itself radically without losing power. This makes a big difference because China can create a liberal free-speech special administrative region (Hong Kong).  The Soviet Union couldn’t create anything like HK.
  
  
• The Constitution of the PRC states that secession is prohibited, whereas the Constitution of the Soviet Union gave republics a right to secede.  This was reflected in the structure of the parties.  The CCP is a highly centralized party, where as the CPSU was theoretically a federation of parties with the Republic parties being nominally independent. 

Adaptation:

• One of the largest differences between Soviet and Chinese Communism is that Chinese Communism lasted but Soviet Communism did not. After Mao’s death, China restructured its government, providing its citizens with greater freedoms and changing its economic policy to favor a market economy open to foreign trade instead of one that was centrally managed.
• During the 1980s, the Soviet government remained unwilling to make reforms it viewed as capitalistic, and the resulting economic decline lead to the Soviet downfall. Since then, Russia has attempted to shift to a market-based economy with mixed results.
• At the same time, China shifted to a system known as market socialism, which differed from the USSR in its reliance on a free market.

Great Leap Forward:

• The Great Leap Forward of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was an economic and social campaign by the Communist Party of China (CPC) from 1958 to 1961. The campaign was led by Mao Zedong and aimed to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a socialist society through rapid industrialization and collectivization. The campaign caused the Great Chinese Famine.
• Chief changes in the lives of rural Chinese included the introduction of a mandatory process of agricultural collectivization, which was introduced incrementally. Private farming was prohibited, and those engaged in it were labeled as counter-revolutionaries and persecuted. Restrictions on rural people were enforced through public struggle sessions, and social pressure, although people also experienced forced labor. Rural industrialization, officially a priority of the campaign, saw “its development … aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward.
• On the communes, a number of radical and controversial agricultural innovations were promoted at the behest of Mao.The policies included close cropping, whereby seeds were sown far more densely than normal on the incorrect assumption that seeds of the same class would not compete with each other
• Substantial effort was expended during the Great Leap Forward on large-scale, but often poorly planned capital construction projects, such as irrigation works often built without input from trained engineers.
• Mao saw grain and steel production as the key pillars of economic development. He forecast that within 15 years of the start of the Great Leap, China’s steel production would surpass that of the UK. In the August 1958 Politburo meetings, it was decided that steel production would be set to double within the year, most of the increase coming through backyard steel furnaces.During this rapid expansion, coordination suffered and material shortages were frequent, resulting in “a huge rise in the wage bill, largely for construction workers, but no corresponding increase in manufactured goods.”Facing a massive deficit, the government cut industrial investment from 38.9 to 7.1 billion yuan from 1960 to 1962 (an 82% decrease; the 1957 level was 14.4 billion)

Backyard furnaces:

• With no personal knowledge of metallurgy, Mao encouraged the establishment of small backyard steel furnaces in every commune and in each urban neighborhood.Huge efforts on the part of peasants and other workers were made to produce steel out of scrap metal.

To fuel the furnaces the local environment was denuded of trees and wood taken from the doors and furniture of peasants’ houses. Pots, pans, and other metal artifacts were requisitioned to supply the “scrap” for the furnaces so that the wildly optimistic production targets could be met. Many of the male agricultural workers were diverted from the harvest to help the iron production as were the workers at many factories, schools and even hospitals.

Although the output consisted of low quality lumps of pig iron which was of negligible economic worth, Mao had a deep distrust of intellectuals and faith in the power of the mass mobilization of the peasants.

Mao visited traditional steel works in Manchuria in January 1959 where he found out that high quality steel could only be produced in large-scale factories using reliable fuel such as coal. However, he decided not to order a halt to the backyard steel furnaces so as not to dampen the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses. The program was only quietly abandoned much later in that year.

Failure of Great Leap Forward:

• The amount of labour diverted to steel production and construction projects meant that much of the harvest was left to rot uncollected in some areas. Although actual harvests were reduced, local officials, under tremendous pressure from central authorities to report record harvests in response to the innovations, competed with each other to announce increasingly exaggerated results. These were used as a basis for determining the amount of grain to be taken by the State to supply the towns and cities, and to export. This left barely enough for the peasants, and in some areas, famine and starvation set in.
• The exact number of famine deaths is difficult to determine, and estimates range from 18 to upwards of 42 million people. Also at least 2.5 million people were beaten or tortured to death and 1 to 3 million committed suicide.
• The years of the Great Leap Forward in fact saw economic regression, with 1958 through 1962 being the only period between 1953 and 1985 in which China’s economy shrank. Enormous amounts of investment produced only modest increases in production or none at all.The Great Leap was a very expensive disaster.
• In subsequent conferences in March 1960 and May 1962, the negative effects of the Great Leap Forward were studied by the CPC, and Mao was criticized in the party conferences. Moderate Party members like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping rose to power, and Mao was marginalized within the party, leading him to initiate the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

De-industrialization of India under the British

After destroying its agriculture British had embarked upon the destruction of Indian industry.

Several Indian historians have argued that British rule led to a de-industrialization of India. By

the Act 11 and 12 William III, cap. 10, it was enacted that the wearing of wrought silks and of

printed or dyed calicoes from India, Persia and China should be prohibited, and a penalty of

£200 imposed on all persons having or selling the same. Similar laws were enacted under George I, II and III, in consequence of the repeated lamentations of the afterward so “enlightened” British manufacturers. And thus, during the greater part of the 18th century, Indian manufactures were generally imported into England in order to he sold on the Continent, and to remain excluded from the English market itself.

Ramesh Chandra Dutt argued (in Economic History of India, London, 1987):

“India in the eighteenth century was a great manufacturing as well as a great agricultural

country, and the products of the Indian loom supplied the markets of Asia and Europe. It is,

unfortunately, true that the East India Company and the British Parliament, following the selfish

commercial policy of a hundred years ago, discouraged Indian manufacturers in the early years

of British rule in order to encourage the rising manufactures of England. Their fixed policy,

pursued during the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth,

was to make India subservient to the industries of Great Britain and to make the Indian people

grow raw produce only, in order to supply material for the looms and manufactories of Great

Britain”.

According to Karl Marx,” However changing the political aspect of India’s past must appear, its

social condition has remained unaltered since its remotest antiquity, until the first decennium of

the 19th century. The handloom and the spinning wheel, producing their regular myriads of

spinners and weavers, were the pivots of the structure of that society.”“It was the British intruder

who broke up the Indian handloom and destroyed the spinning wheel. England began with

driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan,

and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons.” From 1818 to 1836 the export of twist from Great Britain to India rose in the proportion of 1 to 5,200. In 1824 the export of British muslins to India hardly amounted to 1,000,000 yards, while in 1837 it surpassed 64,000,000 of yards. But at the same time the population of Dacca decreased from 150,000 inhabitants to 20,000. This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. “

There is a good deal of truth in the deindustrialization argument. Moghul India did havea bigger

industry than any other country, which became a European colony, and was unique in being an

industrial exporter in pre-colonial times. A large part of the Moghul industry was destroyed in

the course of British rule.The second blow to Indian industry came from massive imports of

cheap textiles from England after the Napoleonic wars: In the period 1896-1913, imported piece goods supplied about 60 per cent of Indian cloth consumption, 45 and the proportion was probably higher for

most of the nineteenth century. Home spinning, which was a spare-time activity of village

women, was greatly reduced.

It took India 130 years to manufacture textiles and to eliminate British textile imports. India

could probably have copied Lancashire's technology more quickly if she had been allowed to

impose a protective tariff in the way that was done in the USA and France in the first few

decades of the nineteenth century, but the British imposed a policy of free trade. British imports

entered India duty free, and when a small tariff was required for revenue purposes Lancashire

pressure led to the imposition of a corresponding excise duty on Indian products to prevent them

gaining a competitive advantage.This undoubtedly handicapped industrial development. If India had been politically independent, her tax structure would probably have been different. In the

1880s, Indian customs revenues were only 2.2 per cent of the trade turnover, i.e. the lowest ratio

in any country. In Brazil, by contrast, import duties at that period were 21 per cent of trade

turnover.

British rule had not promoted industrialization in India either.Japan and China were not

colonized by the British; they remained independent.The Indian steel industry started fifteen

years later than in China, where the first steel mill was built at Hangyang in 1896. The first

Japanese mill was built in 1898. In both China and Japan the first steel mills (and the first textile

mills) were government enterprises, whereas in India the government did its best to promote

imports from Britain.

Until the end of the Napoleonic wars, cotton manufactures had been India’s mainexport.They

reached their peak in 1798, and in 1813 they still amounted to £2 million, but thereafter they fell

rapidly. Thirty years later, half of Indian imports were cotton textiles from Manchester.This

collapse in India’s main export caused a problem for the Company, which had to find ways to

convert its rupee revenue into resources transferable to the UK. The Company therefore

promoted exports of raw materials on a larger scale, including indigo, and opium, which were

traded against Chinese tea. These dope-peddling efforts provoked the Anglo-Chinese war of

1842 in which the British drug-pushers won and forced China to accept more and more opium.

AUGUST OFFER, INDIVIDUAL SATYAGRAHA AND CRIPPS MISSION (1939-1942)

In 1939 the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, declared India a belligerent state on the side of Britain  in WW2 without consulting Indian political leaders or the elected provincial representatives.

CWC Meeting at Wardha (September 10-14, 1939):

Different opinions were voiced on the question of Indian support to British war efforts:

• Gandhi advocated an unconditional support to the Allied powers as he made a clear distinction between the democratic states of Western Europe and the totalitarian Nazis.
• Subhash Bose and the socialists argued that the war was an imperialist one since both sides were fighting for gaining or defending colonial territories. Therefore, the question of supporting either of the two sides did not arise. Instead, advantage should be taken of the situation to wrest freedom by immediately starting a civil disobedience movement.
• Nehru made a sharp distinction between democracy and Fascism. He believed that justice was on the side of Britain, France and Poland, but he was also convinced that Britain and France were imperialist powers, and that the war was the result of the inner contradictions of capitalism maturing since the end of World War I.He, therefore, advocated no Indian participation till India itself was free. However, at the same time, no advantage was to be taken of Britain’s difficulty by starting an immediate struggle.

The CWC resolution condemned Fascist aggression. It said that:

1. India could not be party to a war being fought ostensibly for democratic freedom, while that freedom was being denied to India
2. if Britain was fighting for democracy and freedom, it should prove it by ending imperialism in its colonies and establishing full democracy in India;
3. the Government should declare its war aims soon and, also, as to how the principles of democracy were to be applied to India.

• The Congress leadership wanted to give every chance to the viceroy and the British Government.

Government’s Response:

• The Government’s response was entirely negative. Linlithgow, in his statement (October 17, 1939), tried to use the Muslim League and the princes against the Congress.The Viceroy in statement claimed that Britain is waging a war driven by the motif to strengthen peace in the world. He also stated that after the war, the government would initiate modifications in the Act of 1935, in accordance to the desires of the Indians.
• The Government:

1. Refused to define British war aims beyond stating that Britain was resisting aggression;
2. Said it would, as part of future arrangement, consult “representatives of several communities, parties and interests in India, and the Indian princes” as to how the Act of 1935 might be modified;
3.  Said it would immediately set up a “consultative committee” whose advice could be sought whenever required.

Government’s Hidden Agenda:

1. Linlithgow’s statement was not an aberration, but a part of general British policy “to take advantage of the war to regain the lost ground from the Congress” by provoking the Congress into a confrontation with the Government and then using the extraordinary situation to acquire draconian powers. Even before the declaration of the war, emergency powers had been acquired for the centre in respect of provincial subjects by amending the 1935 Act.
2. Defence of India ordinance had been enforced the day the war was declared, thus restricting civil liberties. In May 1940, a top secret Draft Revolutionary Movement Ordinance had been prepared, aimed at launching crippling pre-emptive strikes on the Congress. The Government could then call upon the
3. Allied troops stationed in India. It could also win an unusual amount of liberal and leftist sympathy all over the world by painting an aggressive Congress as being pro-Japan and pro-Germany.

• British Indian reactionary policies received full support from Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Secretary of State, Zetland, who branded the Congress as a purely Hindu organisation.
• It became clear that the British Government had no intention of loosening its hold, during or after the war, and was willing to treat the Congress as an enemy. Gandhi reacted sharply to the Government’s insensitivity to Indian public opinion—” … there is to be no democracy for India if Britain can prevent it.” Referring to the minorities and other special interests, Gandhi said, “Congress will safeguard minority rights provided they do not advance claims inconsistent with India’s independence.”

On October 23, 1939, the CWC meeting:

1. Rejected the viceroy’s statement as a reiteration of the old imperialist policy,
2. Decided not to support the war, and
3. Called upon the Congress ministries to resign in the provinces.

• Gandhi’s reaction to Linlithgow’s statement of October 1939 was; “the old policy of divide and rule is to continue. The Congress has asked for bread and it has got stone.”
• Congress Provincial Governments from eight provinces resigned .The resignation of the ministers was an occasion of great joy and rejoicing for leader of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He called the day of 22 December 1939 ‘The Day of Deliverance‘.
• In January 1940, Linlithgow stated, “Dominion status of Westminster variety, after the war, is the goal of British policy in India.”

Debate on the Question of Immediate Mass Satyagraha:

• After Linlithgow’s statement of October 1939, the debate on the question of immediate mass struggle began once again.
• Gandhi and his supporters were not in favour of an immediate struggle because they felt that the:

1. Allied cause was just;
2. Communal sensitivity and lack of Hindu-Muslim unity could result in communal riots;
3. Congress organisation was in shambles and the atmosphere was not conducive for a mass struggle; and
4. Masses were not ready for a struggle.

• They instead advocated toning up the Congress organisation, carrying on political work among the masses, and negotiating till all possibilities of a negotiated settlement were exhausted. Only then would the struggle be begun.
• The views of the dominant leadership were reflected in the Congress resolution at the Ramgarh session (March 1940)—”Congress would resort to civil disobedience as soon as the Congress organisation is considered fit enough or if circumstances precipitate a crisis.”
• A coalition of leftist groups—Subhash Bose and his Forward Bloc, Congress Socialist Party, Communist Party, the Royists—characterised the war as an imperialist war giving an opportunity to attain freedom through an all-out struggle against British imperialism.This group was convinced that the masses were ready for action, only waiting for a call from the leadership. They accepted hurdles, such as communalism and the shortcomings of the Congress organisation, but thought that these would be automatically swept away in the course of a struggle. They urged the Congress leadership to launch an immediate mass struggle.
• Bose even proposed a parallel Congress to organise an immediate mass struggle if the Congress leadership was not willing to go along with them, but the CSP and CPI differed with Bose on this.
• Nehru considered the Allied powers as imperialists and his philosophy and political perception leant towards the idea of an early struggle but that would have undermined the fight against Fascism. He finally went along with Gandhi and the Congress majority.

Pakistan Resolution—Lahore (March 1940):

• The Muslim League passed a resolution calling for “grouping of geographically contiguous areas where Muslims are in majority (North-West, East) into independent states in which constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign and adequate safeguards to Muslims where they are in minority”.

Change of Government in England:

• In the meanwhile, crucial political events took place in England. Chamberlain was succeeded by Churchill as the Prime Minister and the Conservatives, who assumed power in England, did not have a sympathetic stance towards the claims made by the Congress.

August Offer, 8 August 1940:

• The fall of France temporarily softened the attitude of congress in India. Britain was in immediate danger of Nazi occupation. As the war was taking a menacing turn from the allied point of view congress offered to cooperate in the war if transfer of authority in India is done to an interim government. The governments response was a statement of the viceroy known as the august offer.
• On 8 August 1940, early in the Battle of Britain, the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, made the so-called August Offer.The following proposals were put in:
1. The establishment of an advisory war council
2. After the war a representative Indian body would be set up to frame a constitution for India.
3. Viceroy’s Executive Council would be expanded without delay.
4. The minorities were assured that the government would not transfer power “to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in Indian national life.”
• For the first time, the inherent right of Indians to frame their constitution was recognised and the Congress demand for a constituent assembly was conceded. Dominion status was explicitly offered.In July 1941, the viceroy’s executive council was enlarged to give the Indians a majority of 8 out of 12 for the first time, but the whites remained in charge of defence, finance and home. Also, a National Defence Council was set up with purely advisory functions.
• The Congress rejected the August Offer. Nehru said, “Dominion status concept is dead as a door nail.” Gandhi said that the declaration had widened the gulf between the nationalists and the British rulers.
• The Muslim League welcomed the veto assurance given to the League, and reiterated its position that partition was the only solution to the deadlock.
• In the context of widespread dissatisfaction that prevailed over the rejection of the demands made by the Congress, Gandhi at the meeting of the Congress Working Committee in Wardha revealed his plan to launch Individual Civil Disobedience.

Individual Satyagraha 1940-41:

• Towards the end of 1940, the Congress once again asked Gandhi to take command. Gandhi now began taking steps which would lead to a mass struggle within his broad strategic perspective
• After the August Offer, disappointed radicals and leftists wanted to launch a mass Civil Disobedience Movement, but here Gandhi insisted on Individual Satyagraha.
• The Individual Satyagraha was not to seek independence but to affirm the right of speech. The other reason of this Satyagraha was that a mass movement may turn violent and he would not like to see the Great Britain embarrassed by such a situation.
• This view was conveyed to Lord Linlithgow by Gandhi when he met him on September 27, 1940.
• The aims of launching individual satyagrahas were:(i) To show that nationalist patience was not due to weakness; (ii) to express people’s feeling that they were not interested in the war and that they made no distinction between Nazism and the double autocracy that ruled India; and (iii) to give another opportunity to the Government to accept Congress’ demands peacefully.
• The non-violence was set as the centerpiece of Individual Satyagraha. This was done by carefully selecting the Satyagrahis.
• The first Satyagrahi selected was Acharya Vinoba Bhave, who was sent to Jail when he spoke against the war.
• Second Satyagrahi was Jawahar Lal Nehru.
• Third was Brahma Datt, one of the inmates of the Gandhi’s Ashram. They all were sent to jails for violating the Defense of India Act.
• This was followed by a lot of other people. But since it was not a mass movement, it attracted little enthusiasm and in December 1940, Gandhi suspended the movement. The campaign started again in January 1941, this time, thousands of people joined and around 20 thousand people were arrested.On 3 December 1941, the Viceroy ordered the acquittal of all the satyagrahis.
• The British feared the destabilizing of India might encourage a Japanese invasion, and would reduce the number of men who volunteered to fight the war. Japan in 1942 had overrun Malaya and was into Burma; the threat of an invasion of India was real. London wanted the cooperation and support of Indian political leaders in order to recruit more Indians into the British Indian Army, which was fighting in the Middle East theatre.

Cripps Mission:

• In March 1942, a mission headed by Stafford Cripps was sent to India with constitutional proposals to seek Indian support for the war.
• Stafford Cripps was a left-wing Labourite, the leader of the House of Commons and and government minister in the War Cabinet of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. who had actively supported the Indian national movement.

Why Cripps Mission was sent:

1.  To secure full Indian cooperation and support for their efforts in World War II, because of the reverses suffered by Britain in South-East Asia, the Japanese threat to invade India seemed real now ‘and Indian support became crucial.
2. There was pressure on Britain from the Allies (USA, USSR, and China) to seek Indian cooperation.
3. Indian nationalists had agreed to support the Allied cause if substantial power was transferred immediately and complete independence given after the war.

• The Congress was divided upon its response to India’s entry into World War II. Angry over the decision made by the Viceroy, some Congress leaders favoured launching a revolt against the British despite the gravity of the war in Europe, which threatened Britain’s own freedom. Others, such as Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, advocated offering an olive branch to the British, supporting them in this crucial time in the hope that the gesture would be reciprocated with independence after the war. The major leader, Mohandas Gandhi, was opposed to Indian involvement in the war as he would not morally endorse a war and also suspected British intentions, believing that the British were not sincere about Indian aspirations for independence. But Rajagopalachari, backed by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Maulana Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru held talks with Cripps and offered full support in return for immediate self-government, and eventual independence.
• Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, supported the war effort and condemned the Congress policy. Insisting on a Pakistan, a separate Muslim state, he resisted Congress’s calls for pan-Indian cooperation and immediate independence

Main Proposals:

1.  An Indian Union with a dominion status; would be set up; it would be free to decide its relations with the Commonwealth and free to participate in the United Nations and other international bodies.
2.  After the end of the war, a constituent assembly would be convened to frame a new constitution. Members of this assembly would be partly elected by the provincial assemblies through proportional representation and partly nominated by the princes.
3. The British Government would accept the new constitution subject to two conditions: (i) any province not willing to join the Union could have a separate constitution and form a separate Union, and (ii) the new constitution- making body and the British Government would negotiate a treaty to effect the transfer of power and to safeguard racial and religious minorities.
4. In the meantime, defence of India would remain in British hands and the governor-general’s powers would remain intact.

Departures from the Past and Implications:

1. The making of the constitution was to be solely in Indian hands now (and not “mainly” in Indian hands—as contained in the August Offer).
2.  A concrete plan was provided for the constituent assembly.
3. Option was available to any province to have a separate constitution—a blueprint for India’s partition.
4. Free India could withdraw from the Commonwealth.
5. Indians were allowed a large share in the administration in the interim period.

Why Cripps Mission Failed:

(a)The Cripps Mission proposals failed to satisfy Indian nationalists and turned out to be merely a propaganda device for US and Chinese consumption. Cripps had designed the proposals himself, but they were too radical for Churchill and the Viceroy, and too conservative for the Indians; no middle way was found. Congress moved toward the Quit India movement whereby it refused to cooperate in the war effort. Various parties and groups had objections to the proposals on different points.

The Congress’s objections:

1. The offer of dominion status instead of a provision for complete independence
2. Representation of the states by nominees and not by elected representatives
3. Right to provinces to secede as this went against the principle of national unity
4. Absence of any plan for immediate transfer of power and absence of any real share in defence; the governor- general’s supremacy had been retained, and the demand for governor-general being only the constitutional head had not been accepted.                                                  Nehru and Maulana Azad were the official negotiators for the Congress.

The Muslim League’s objections:

1. Criticised the idea of a single Indian Union.
2. Did not like the machinery for the creation of a constituent assembly and the procedure to decide on the accession of provinces to the Union.
3. Thought that the proposals denied to the Muslims the right to self-determination and the creation of Pakistan.

Other groups’ objections:

1. The Liberals considered the secession proposals to be against the unity and security of India.
2. The Hindu Mahasabha criticised the basis of the right to secede.
3. The depressed classes thought that partition would leave them at the mercy of the caste Hindus.
4. The Sikhs objected that partition would take away Punjab from them.

(b)The explanation that the proposals were meant not to supersede the August Offer but to clothe general provisions with precision put British intentions in doubt.

(c) There was confusion over what Cripps had been authorised to offer India’s nationalist politicians by Churchill and Leo Amery (His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India), and he also faced hostility from the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow.The incapacity of Cripps to go beyond the Draft Declaration and the adoption of a rigid “take it or leave it” attitude added to the deadlock. Cripps had earlier talked of “cabinet” and “national government” but later he said that he had only meant an expansion of the executive council.

(d), in public, he failed to present any concrete proposals for greater self-government in the short term, other than a vague commitment to increase the number of Indian members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council. Cripps spent much of his time in encouraging Congress leaders and Jinnah to come to a common, public arrangement in support of the war and government.

(d)The procedure of accession was not well-defined. The decision on secession was to be taken by a resolution in the legislature by a 60% majority. If less than 60% of” members supported it, the decision was to be taken by a plebiscite of adult males of that province by a simple majority. This scheme weighed against the Hindus in Punjab and Bengal if they wanted accession to the Indian Union.

(e)It was not clear as to who would implement and interpret the treaty effecting the transfer of power.

(f)Churchill (the British prime minister), Amery (the secretary of state), Linlithgow (the viceroy) and Ward (the commander-in-chief) consistently torpedoed Cripps’ efforts.

(g)Talks broke down on the question of the viceroy’s veto.

(h)Gandhi described the scheme as “a post-dated cheque drawn on a crashing bank”; Nehru pointed out that the “existing structure and autocratic powers would remain and a few of us will become the viceroy’s liveried camp followers and look after canteens and the like”.

(i)Stafford Cripps returned home leaving behind a frustrated and embittered Indian people, who, though still sympathising with the victims of Fascist aggression, felt that the existing situation in the country had become intolerable and that the time had come for a final assault on imperialism.