India is on a surge; a
great destiny awaits it. If there is one single factor that could negate or
retard it, it will be its failure to govern itself. Ensuring safety and
security of its people, upholding the rule of law, managing change with order
and ensuring legitimacy of power by those who wield it shall be critical
components of that governance. Should it fail to happen, history will once
again lament India couldn’t do what it could.
In post war period,
internal security has become primary source of degradation, destabilization and
retardation of the states as against external aggression. More than 80% of the
states during this period faced state failure, disintegration, break down of
their political or constitutional systems consequented by internal conflicts
and violence. The causative factors leading to internal security dysfunction
ranged from political turmoils, sectarian violence, economic deprivation or
social breakdowns. Significantly, while the internal fault lines provided the
basic munition, the external factor often catalyzed the process to make it
decisively unmanageable. Failure to address the external factor in internal
security management made the states to lose their capacity to control the
avalanche that initially appeared as a trickle. In the evolving security
setting, the conventional law and order approach is increasingly proving to be
grossly inadequate to meet the new generation Internal Security threats.
Management of Internal
Security – New Realities:
India, in architecting its internal security doctrines, systems and policy
needs to factor in the following:
- Wars
are increasingly proving to be cost ineffective instruments of achieving
strategic and political objectives. With the emergence of Fourth
Generation Warfare (4GW), a fight against an invisible enemy, hidden
within the civil society, the consequences of wars can be highly
unpredictable with no assured guarantee of success to the stronger. Defeat
of Soviet Union by religious irregulars in Afghanistan, American
experiencing in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistani army losing out
to Shanti Bahini in Bangladesh etc. are illustrative of the limits of
military power against Fourth Generation Warfare.
- Civil
society has become the battle grounds whose control is sought both by the
violent anti state groups and the state. It has given rise to the doctrine
of proxy war. Hostile states, to bleed their adversaries, are increasingly
patronising armed groups operating in their enemy countries. It has opened
a new window of opportunity to weaker powers to take on their more
powerful adversaries in what we call as asymmetric warfare. In these, weaker
states can bleed their more powerful adversaries through Covert Action
(CA) at a low cost, in a sustained manner and claim deniability.
In the
Indian context, Pakistan that harbours compulsive hostility against India but
lacks the capability to achieve its political and strategic objectives,
militarily or otherwise, has made CA as an instrument of its state policy.
Pakistan has leveraged its geographical proximity, radical Islam, India’s soft
governance, nuclear blackmail, military alliances etc. as tools to capitalize
over India’s internal security vulnerabilities.
- (a)Phenomenal
up-gradation in capabilities, resources, international linkages and
support bass of violent groups is another disturbing phenomenon.
Countering them requires security infrastructure much beyond and complex
than required for maintaining peace and order in civil society and
enforcing the rule of law. With the emergence of large well armed and
organized armed groups the states are facing erosion in their monopoly
over coercive power. With the sophisticated weapons systems, modern
communication equipments, huge financial resources, access to modern
technology and support of rogue states, activities of these groups have
placed internal security in a different orbit altogether.
In the
Indian context, the Islamic terrorist groups not only are patronized and
supported by Pakistan but maintain close nexus with gun runners, drug
traffickers, organized crimes, hawala racketeers, currency counterfeiters etc.
- Diminishing
efficacy of conventional response policies and systems and inability of
states to keep pace with them is another infirmity. The conventional
response, particularly in liberal democracies, treats acts of violence (no
matter how gruesome) as normal crimes, punishable through due process of
law, and not as acts of war. This jurisprudence is heavily weighed in
favour of the wrong doer and is practically inoperable against those who
operate from foreign lands. Instruments of state, its laws, police,
judicial systems and even militaries, find themselves grossly inadequate
to prevent, protect and penalize the wrong doers.
Besides
above, in India, soft governance, political factor and corruption have further
eaten into the vitals of state power. Political factor has started casting its
ominous shadow, both over enactment of right laws and their enforcement with
full political will. The withdrawal of Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act
(POTA), Centre’s reluctance to approve Special Acts against organized crimes in
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh etc. are illustrative of politicization of internal
security management.
- (a)Role
of non state actors like the Media, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
think tanks, etc., have also added to complexity of the situation.
Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism and media inadvertently plays in
their hands by giving them undue coverage. As perception management is an
important aspect of internal security management, ability of these groups
to influence the public opinion, without any corresponding responsibility,
only confounds the problem.
India: Slow to Transform
India is not unique in experiencing this paradigm
shift. What singles it out is the fact that having paid the highest price
in battling against terrorism, insurgencies etc. in terms of over 90,000 human
lives lost and nearly 14,000 security personnel killed and huge drain on its
scare financial resources; it has been the slowest, if at all, to change.
Globally, the response has been swift and decisive
while in India it has been delayed,half
hearted and often lacking political will. The systems, doctrines, methodology,
laws, empowerment and enablement of
security apparatus have by and large
remained unchanged. Within 48 hours of September 11 (9/11) strike, the US took
the policy decision to revamp the whole
system and bring in the huge new infrastructure, concepts and laws to create
Department of Home Land Security and institution of Director National
Intelligence. President Bush announced that “It values individual freedom but
should it get in conflict with supreme national interest, the latter will
prevail”. Instead of systematic improvements we merely resorted to quantitative
response hoping that enhanced force level without change in training, systems,
equipment etc would be sufficient to counter terrorism and fight insurgencies.
The expenditure on state
police forces and central para military forces cumulatively have increased in
last few years from Rs. 15,092 crores nearly to Rs. 26,000 crores, depicting an
increase over 70%. In terrorist and insurgency affected areas 22% troops are
tied on duties to protect themselves and other 45% on protecting the VIPs and
vital installations. With 11% force
personnel on leave and training reserves and 5% engaged on administrative
duties; what is really left to mount field operations is less than 20%. For
want of powerful laws, enhanced operational level intelligence, bold political
decisions, lack of new strategic and tactical ideas, we have got entrapped in conventional stereotype of numerical response to
internal security. The dogma of
‘time-tested methods’ has become a doctrine to resist change.
India’s internal security
landscape in recent decades has undergone a paradigm shift. The conventional
pattern of civil disorders, communal disturbances, social and economic turmoil, political conflicts etc. have
seized to be the nation’s primary internal security concerns. They have been
substituted by externally sponsored covert
offensives by hostile powers targeting country’s internal fault lines to
achieve their strategic objectives. While country’s democratic polity, economic
growth, and social transformations are steadily
bringing down conventional threats, except probably the Left Wing Extremism,
the external factor has been an important catalytic factor in promoting
terrorism, insurgencies, espionage,
subversion, cyber space violations, currency counterfeiting, Hawala
transactions, demographic invasion etc. India considering its Comprehensive
National Power (CNP), has failed is politically and diplomatically leverage it
to its best security advantage.
Jehadi Terrorism:-
Kashmir and Beyond
Pakistan which, during the Afghan war through Western assistance, had acquired formidable covert capabilities,
re-positioned the elaborate infrastructure to bleed and destabilize India through terrorism. It wanted to
replicate Afghan model in Kashmir, hoping
to make it a theatre of Jehad for all the Muslims and force India to a
settlement acceptable to Pakistan. Though it failed to achieve this objective,
over the years Jehadis have became integral part of Pakistan’s war-machine and
a low cost instrument in its hands to bleed India. Pakistani researcher Sabina
Ahmad in her report to International Crisis Group (ICG) calculated 11,500
Pakistani nationals having been killed in India in terrorist operations from
1990 to 2005. This is indicative of the scale and intensity of Pakistan
sponsored Jehadi terrorism.
Growth of Jehadi forces, perceiving India as its target, both in
India’s western and eastern neighbourhoods, is a serious security and
ideological threat given India’s large indigenous Muslim population. While
sizeable population of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh has come under its spate, desperate attempts are being made to spread its tentacles within India. Superimposition
of this exported variant of Islam constitutes a high potential long term threat
for India and will have to be countered – ideologically, politically and
physically.
Besides J&K, hundreds
of Muslim youth drawn from other parts of the country have been trained and
motivated for subversive activities
in Pakistan. A large number of Pakistani youth trained by the ISI and disguised as Indians have been
positioned as part of an intricately
networked covert apparatus. Mushrooming of Madrassas and Islamic institutions
in large numbers propagating an ideology of hate and exclusiveness, particularly in the border areas, is another
disturbing trend. An imaginative policy initiative and counter measures would
have to be taken to meet this threat.
The 26/11 terrorist
action at Mumbai depicted a new order of lethality
in Pakistan’s unabated covert
offensive against India. For almost three decades, India has passively accepted such provocations. It has failed to retaliate in a proactive manner that could raise costs for Pakistan and compel it
to roll back its anti-India terrorist infrastructure. India ceded the strategic and tactical
initiative to Pakistan some three decades ago and needs a course correction
before it poses an existentialist threat.
India’s tolerance threshold should not be unrealistically raised in the
backdrop of nuclear blackmail as Pakistan has its own vulnerabilities many
times higher than India and in its strategic calculus it cannot ignore the
threat that India can pose should the conflict grow beyond a point. India also
needs to revisit its no first use nuclear doctrine.
Left Wing Extremism:
Left Wing Extremism has emerged as country’s most serious internal security
challenge. After its cyclic rise and fall, it assumed serious proportions after
2004 when PWG and MCC, along with other splinter groups, merged together to
form the CPI (Maoists). The spatial growth of the LWE thereafter has been
meteoric and alarming. Maoists for furtherance of their political objective of
seizing power through gun have exploited alienations caused by issues like
denial of social and economic justice to deprived sections of society, large
scale displacement of tribal populations by major hydro-electric projects and
extensive mining in tribal areas. This has led to their influence rising from
53 Districts in 9 states in 2001, to nearly 203 Districts in 18 states by 2010.
Among these the core of insurgency is focused in Chattisgarh (Abujmar Region)
and Jharkhand with significant activity levels in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh,
Maharashtra and Orissa. The movement has been substantially militarised with
16,000 armed cadres, some 15,000 assorted weapons (including 900 AK-47 Rifles,
200 Light Machine Guns and locally fabricated Rocket Launchers), over 85 camps
where they are able to impart training in tactics and field craft and strong
financial back up to pay regular salaries to members of its so called ‘People’s
Liberation Army’.
The Left Wing Extremism
embodies many features that make the problem intractable. A large inaccessible
and scantily governed terrain that is difficult to dominate or sanitize no
matter what force levels are pumped is one major problem. Further, to their
advantage, the Maoists have a large alienated population that has suffered
decades of social and economic neglect and are easily susceptible to motivated
propaganda of the Maoists who promise to establish an order that will deliver
justice, freedom from exploitation, jobs and protection of their way of life. A
corrupt and callous governance further makes the people an easy prey to Maoist
propaganda. They are able exploit all local grievances and conflicts to gather
support by promising different things to different people. It may range from
exploiting caste conflicts in Bihar, resentment against land lords in Andhra,
sentiment against forest laws and practices in tribal areas, unemployment among
youth or Islamic sentiment among sections of Muslims telling them all that
Maoism provided solutions to all their woes. Availability of large sums money
to pay regular salaries; to their cadres in areas where there are large bodies
of uneducated and unskilled who are not only unemployed but for most jobs
unemployable.
However, they have some
high vulnerabilities as well. Illustratively, like the most ideology driven
movements, Left Wing Extremism is controlled by less than a dozen top kingpins
and nearly 30 commanders of its armed cadre. They determine the political line,
control the resources and design the strategy. The bulk of 16,000 odd armed
cadres and many times more supporters are only gullible tribals and poor people
misled by vicious propaganda, frightened by the gun or lured by the money. For
the leaders, who live in conditions of safety and comfort, they are easily
replaceable commodities. Neutralization of top leaders and activists in four
decade long history of Left Extremism has invariably led to ideological
dilution, dissensions, and demoralization giving a blow to their image of
invincibility and surfacing of doubts about viability of the movement to
achieve its goals through violence. At tactical level, it has led to struggle
for leadership, disruption in sources of funding and abandonment of plans in
the offing. Further, the questioning of top leaders has often provided strategic
and tactical inputs which, when pursued imaginatively, substantially weakened
the movement.
Devoid of its ideological
plank the movement stands reduced to a problem of organized crime. A credible,
focused and sustained psy-war offensive to expose the movement as anti-people
will be hard for them to bear.
Money factor is another
important element that is empowering the Left Wing Extremism to raise new
cadres, procure weapons and expand their arc of influence. A freshly recruited
youth is being paid rupees 2,000 to 2,500 per month, which in a poverty
stricken area attracts many youth. It is estimated that the left wing extremist
are able to collect nearly rupees 1200 crore a year, which is a huge money
resource in tribal and backward areas. Maoists raise these funds through
extortions, collections from corrupt government officials, protection money,
levies on rich landlords, businessmen, contractors, transporters etc.
Paradoxically, increase in government outlays for development activities in
affected areas has strengthened them financially as enhanced outlays are not
backed up by effective and accountable administrative machinery. Their
dependency on funds is a vulnerability and it is possible to take series of
steps to minimize if not totally eliminate it though strong administrative and
legal actions against the fund providers.
North-East:
North East security discourse, of
late, has been marked by good news of peace engagement with the rebels,
improved security cooperation from Bangladesh, dissensions within insurgent
groups etc. However, external factor in a region that has 5,215 kms contiguous
international border with other countries and only about over 1% with the
Indian main land though pivotal is being glossed
over. External factor has and will continue to remain a vital factor in our
management of North Eastern security.
China, with which India
has uneasy security relationship,
shares a border of nearly 1,561 kms with NE states. It also has a dubious track record of meddling with local insurgent groups
till mid eighties. After a long lull,
there is increasing evidence of China reviving
its Covert offensive in the North
East. Chinese support to the rebel groups has waxed and waned depending on content and direction of bilateral
relationship, their evaluation of the strength and grit of people in power in Delhi, viability and reliability of insurgent groups etc. It is also noteworthy that whenever assistance from
erstwhile East Pakistan, and later
Bangladesh, to NE insurgents became difficult, the Chinese stepped in to fill in the gap.
There are definite
indications that, after a long lull, there is major policy shift in China. In
October, 2007, on the invitation of Chinese authorities, Anthony Shimray
in-charge foreign affairs of NSCN(IM), visited China and held meetings with Lee
Wuen, head of intelligence of Yunnan province and Chang local intelligence head
at DehongMansi near Kunming in China. Shimray, handed over a letter to the
Chinese authorities signed by Muivah, self styled Prime Minister of NSCN(IM),
holding peace talks with government of India. The letter informed Chinese of
appointment of Kholose, a Sema Naga, as their permanent representative in
China. Chinese welcomed this institutionalized arrangement and wanted Nagas to
keep them informed about (i) Activities and movements of Indian Army,
particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, (ii) Intelligence regarding activities of
Dalai Lama and Tibetans in India and (iii) Progress of peace talks with India.
Chinese also tasked them to keep track of other NE insurgent groups and
progress of their peace parleys with India. One of the major responsibilities
of Kholose was procurement of weapons from China.
In April 2009, the self styled President of NSCN(IM),
IsakChissiSwu, leader of group talking to India, accompanied by Shimray visited China for which the Visa was
arranged by the Chinese intelligence in Philippines. They held a high level
meeting with one General Lee and three senior Chinese intelligence officers.
The Chinese while assuring them of Military cooperation, again reiterated their earlier requirement
regarding information abut army movements in Arunachal, activities of Dalai
Lama etc. NSCN(IM) leadership subsequently initiated follow up actions in
Delhi, Dharmshala, Arunachal Pradesh and NSCN(IM) headquarters to meet Chinese
intelligence requirements. Steps in the meantime also commenced to ship 1000
weapons from South Chinese port of Beihei to Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh for the
NSCN (IM).
PareshBaruah of ULFA
after being pressurized by Bangladesh security agencies, also visited China in
2010. Reports indicate that he led a group of about 80 that after receiving
training in Ruili in Yunnan was provided substantial
quantities of weapons. It is significant that ULFA has been a source of procurement of weapons by Left Wing
Extremists and possibility of some of the Chimes weapons reaching them through
ULFA channels can not be ruled out.
Reality of Chinese
renewed interest in NE insurgency can not be wished away in our security
calculus. It assumes special import in the back drop of China’s emerging
aggressiveness, military activities in border areas, claims on Arunachal Pradesh
and linkages of Left Extremists with NE insurgent groups. The government in
pursuing its policy of engaging the rebels in peace talks needs to display
greater clarity of vision, well defined objectives and strategic precision. Mistaking the talks as an end
rather than means to an end can push India into a self made strategic trap.
While the rebel groups are enhancing their capabilities, establishing
trans-border linkages, procuring new weapons and recruiting new cadres, the
government appears to be calculating publicity mileage and possible electoral
advantages as their sole gains. This can be a self defeating strategy.
Illegal Immigration:
The size geographical location and porosity
of our borders makes large illegal migration to India from neighboring
countries possible. People of all neighbouring countries share at least one
important ethnic, religious or linguistic commonality with a section of the
Indian population, which makes it possible for them to find easy shelters and
go undetected. Economic opportunities afforded by relatively higher economic
growth, freedoms of a liberal democratic polity, corruption, shortcomings of
Indian political, administrative and judicial systems etc. have all contributed
to make illegal immigration a major internal security problem.
Demographic invasion from
Bangladesh, has already assumed alarming proportions. In many of the bordering
districts of Assam and West Bengal it has brought about a total demographic
transformation, forcing the original inhabitants to sell their lands and flee.
Instead of abating, the last two years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the inflow
– the new migrants becoming more abrasive
and emboldened, considering their
illegal migration almost a matter of right. Subdued
though, voices in support of greater Bangladesh have started surfacing both in
Assam and Bangladesh.
The illegal immigrants
from Bangladesh, who well exceed 2.5 million now, are no more confined to bordering
states of Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya etc. but have found new habitations in
depth areas of the country. Most of them have been able to acquire identity
documents with local political patronage
and connivance of corrupt officials.
The local Muslims in some areas are facilitating their settlements and helping
them in procurement of ration cards, identity documents, jobs and political
patronage.
This large scale
migration is no more only a cause of demographic change, social conflicts, denial of economic opportunities and
civic amenities to our own poor people but has become a security concern. The
Islamic terrorists from Bangladesh readily
find local shelters in length and breadth of the country. These immigrants also
bring with them deeply ingrained
anti-Indian ideas and seeds of fundamentalism. The border is porous and the infiltrators get full support from
Bangladesh Border Forces. This unending
stream of migrants is likely to become much more pronounced in the times to
come, given the push factor in Bangladesh and the pull factor on the Indian
side.
Illegal migration from
Pakistan and Afghanistan is relatively small but its security implications are
much greater. Pakistan as part of a long-term covert action programme, is
trying to establish modules in different parts of the country with well trained
and highly motivated Pak residents masquerading
as Indians. A large number of Pakistanis who enter India with regular visas
frequently go under ground and become untraceable.
Unemployment in Youth:
Though, essentially an economic and not a security issue if left unattended
large scale youth unemployment can have serious security implications. India
currently has a population of nearly 1.2 bn, 62.9% of which is in working age
group. By 2026, India’s population profile is likely to grow even younger
(68.4%in working age group) and the total population at 1.4 bn will overtake
that of China. This translates into one billion people in the working age group
that will need to be gainfully employed. Any failure will make large sections
of unemployed youth vulnerable to forces of destabilization, disruption and
destruction – both indigenous and foreign inspired. Channelised constructively,
they can catapult India into a new power orbit making its human resource capital
in the ageing world as a non-competeable CNP component for many decades ahead.
The total sum of jobs
presently in India’s Public and private sector (including those in the
unorganized private sector) work out to barely 300-350 million. India’s economic
liberalization, so far is only producing the miracle of jobless growth. Most
Indian industries have been imitating the Western corporate model – downsizing
the workforce to maximize the profits. The Jamshedpur Steel plant of the Tatas
that employed 80,000 workers some three decades ago with a production of 1
million tons per annum halved it to just 40,000 in the 1990’s and the output
rose to 5 million tons per annum by automation. The plan is to further reduce
the work force to just 20,000 but raise the production to 10 million tons per
years. While to achieve global competitiveness India cannot afford to produce
at high costs, it at the same cannot afford to keep its millions out of a job.
A paradigm shift in over growth strategy is required and heavy investments need
to be done in areas that can create large employment opportunities; nearly 700
million jobs by 2026. Man power intensive industries like ship building,
infrastructure projects, rural employment schemes etc. will have to be accorded
high priority. Generation of new and upgradation of existing skills through
massive vocational training programmes need to be launched substituting the
conventional educational pattern that churns out youth who are educated but
unemployable. One of the ironies of Indian employment market is that
while there are large numbers of youth with 10 to 16 years of formal education,
most of the industries and employers find it difficult to get appropriate
manpower that hardly requires training of two years or less beyond two years
beyond basic 10 to 12 years of schooling. Non inclusive growth, large
scale unemployment, huge income disparities etc. can be potential causes of
internal instability and degradation. In national economic planning the
strategico- security factors need to be given its deserved importance.
